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Introduction
Although in most European countries health care is predominantly statefinanced, in many countries an increasing share of the population gets medical treatment in the private sector. The growth of the private health care sector in Europe is driven by some factors such as: The inability of uniform health services to satisfy heterogeneous preferences for health care (Hall and Preston, 1998; Besley et al, 1996; 1999) ; differences in certain quality dimensions of provision (Jofre-Bonet, 2000a, Costa and Garcia, 2003) ; and, an increased consumer demand for choice and a direct access to providers (Propper 1993 , Costa-Font and Font-Vilalta, 2004 , Rodriguez and Stoyanova, 2004 .
Buying private health insurance has also been referred as indicative of 'opting-out' whereby individuals express their lack of satisfaction with the system (Calnan et al., 1993) and has also been referred to as the "exit voice" (Hirchman, 1970) . Since in very few countries "leaving" the public system completely is an option, obtaining data to test the opting out hypothesis is extremely difficult. More general empirical research on individual perceptions and attitudes towards the NHS and purchase of private health insurance (PHI) indicate that both decisions might not be independent. This has been found to be the case in the United Kingdom (Propper, 1993; Propper, 2000, Burchardt and Propper, 2000) . Nevertheless, the specific question of whether taking private health insurance undermines support for publicly funded health care controlling for relevant variables such and individual specific insurance premium has not been fully examined.
The decision to 'partially' opt-out from the NHS -mainly for elective care purposes and without stopping contribution towards the NHS-by purchasing PHI reveals important political economy issues worth testing: On the one hand, individuals partially opting-out do free up resources for those NHS services that they do not use. Indeed, Besley and Coate (1991) show that if individuals can consume at most one unit of a good and given a certain quality of NHS care, consuming private health care implies comunsimubng care that otherwise would be NHS provided. Yet, if those going private are relatively well off individuals who continue to finance the system, their exiting the system could arguably improve the health system's equity (Besley and Coate, 1991) . On the other hand, health services are more likely to suffer government failures (Smith et al, 2001) 1 . Those individuals that opt out might not be willing to finance the NHS in those areas that they do not use, and would therefore be less supportive of NHS improvements. Hall and Preston (1998) and Burchardt and Propper (2000) find some empirical support for this hypothesis.
However, those studies lacked data on relevant structural variables such as insurance premiums and health status which approximate the economic sacrifice involved in purchasing PHI and the need of health care.
This paper aims at empirically examining whether the uptake of PHI influences the individual's propensity to have a non-supportive attitude towards the NHS. As suggested by Hall and Preston (1998) , one might well argue that common unobserved factors might influence both decisions and accordingly we estimate several specifications of the probability of showing lack of support for the NHS to circumvent this problem: We start with a simple probit model but then estimate an instrumented variables probit model and a recursive bivariate probit model to capture and control for the potential correlation between the two underlying processes that's stand behind these two decisions ( Fabbri et al, 2004) .
We employ data from the 1994 Catalan Health Survey (CHS), which contains data on health and socio-economic information as well as on insurance premiums and income at a representative level. Based on both fundamental and empirical grounds, the examination of the issue at hand with these data appears as an especially suitable exercise: The data was collected in Catalonia, a region-state of Spain, which is a paradigmatic example of a European country where health care is mainly tax financed -following the lines of a NHS -though 15% of total population has a PHI subscription and private care accounts for 25% of total health expenditure in 2002. In the last twenty years, the Spanish NHS has adopted as decentralised structure based on region-state policy responsibilities (Lopez-Casasnovas et al., 2005) . The particular region-state Catalonia exhibits a historically high share of individually purchased PHI. Indeed, between 22 and 25% of the population during 1990s and up until 2003 purchased PHI. PHI is a supplementary financial arrangement that offers non-elective care coverage at a similar level as that provided by the NHS (e.g., specialist's medical care) but at a higher perceived quality (e.g., lower waiting times etc) 2 .
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 reports a review of the relevant literature. Section 3, describes the institutional setting, the dataset used and outlines the econometric specification taken to the data. The estimation results are presented in section 4. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes.
Background
A central aspect of the public policy debate to date is on the interaction between the public and the private sector and its underlying influences. Besley and Coate (1991) , Gouveia (1996) and Stiglitz (1974) suggest that individuals that optout for the public sector might not be willing support economically and politically the allocation public sector resources to such areas, as it is the case of publicly financed health care. The departing argument for our paper originates in the phenomenon described in Besley and Coate (1991) by which health care aims at ensuring equity and efficiency goals. Given that it provides a relatively uniform health care financing it with a progressively-tax-based public funding. Thus, the public provision of health care may be seen as the result of a majority supporting a "guaranteed" public provision of health care. However, once some general coverage has been provided, those who benefit less by this public system, namely the high contributors may 'optout' by buying PHI. In this context, purchase of PHI can also be interpreted as a signal that they would not support a quality of care improving NHS reform because it would lead to a higher contribution. Since usually those in the upper income distribution do not constitute a sufficient majority to show a clear opposition to public spending, they have to content themselves by supporting low public spending and increasingly opting-out whenever the standards of quality of the public financed health care are below their personal needs.
Nevertheless, individuals are heterogeneous in preferences for redistribution, and better-informed -and relatively richer individuals -might prefer privately provided health care (Propper and Burchardt, 1999) . Thus, whether enrolling in private health care sector leads to a lesser support for an NHS improvement is individual specific and relies on observable and unobservable factors. Propper (2000) argues that if the extension of the private sector is accompanied by a reduction in the willingness to pay taxes this could drive the NHS into a 'poor services for the poor'. In this sense, Propper (2000) finds empirical evidence that users of private services are richer and more likely to support the political right as well as less supportive of equity goals of the NHS. However, it is pointed out how political attitudes are in themselves endogenenous and underpin other individual specific effects such as the preference for private sectors in general.
In countries where the NHS provides full coverage, opting out is only partial and refers to buying privately some elective care which the relatively more affluent wish to obtain more promptly (Besley et al., 1996) . However, as explained above, the development of a PHI market might reduce the size of the coalition of NHS supporters. Therefore, although in the short run equity in the finance of the NHS might improve, in the long run, what we can term as the "secession of the wealthy" might have inverse equity effects, providing an explanation for the deterioration of public health care: Those opting out of the system might be willing to change the composition of private health care towards those procedures that they consume within the NHS or they might want to reduce the NHS size in order to pay fewer taxes.
Empirical strategies to test the interaction between support for public sector and the development of the private sector are complex and limited by revelation problems. Indeed, first of all, rational individuals do not have incentives to reveal their 'true' willingness to finance public sector activities, which is broadly known as the 'free rider problem'. Second, individual preferences over the re-allocation of funds to existing programs instead of rising taxes cannot easily be inferred either. However, despite of these restrictions some empirical strategies have been implemented that overcome some measurement limitations. Using survey and budgetary experiments Strauss and Hughes (1976) find that education and medical care receive a high priority in comparison to other government programs. More recent studies establish a link between the individual expression of a private demand for a publicly provided good (e.g., health care) and the individual preferences for the structure of public services (Preston and Ridge, 1995; Hall and Preston, 1998) . Using evidence of the Social Attitudes Survey, Preston and Ridge (1995) estimate the demand for local public spending taking into account potential 'revelation biases' associated with "survey" responses.
3. The empirical application.
The institutional setting
Spain structures the provision and funding of health care as a system of regional health services, so called the NHS (Lopez Casanovas et al., 2004) . With the exception of nine percent of funds collected at the regional level, the NHS is centrally financed and the regional resource allocation has turned out into a central block grant transfer based on of an unadjusted capitation formula. The Spanish NHS provides health care free of charge at the point of use except for pharmaceuticals and dental care. In contrast with the situation in other regions, more than half of Catalan health expenditure is private, and the system works on a contractual basis. Health care is one of the most politicised areas of public policy debate in
Spain. The NHS is envisaged as a 'prioritised' public service, presumably fulfilling personal as well as socio-political goals that affect the legitimacy of the welfare government. According to the Spanish public opinion survey on health care
(Barómetro Sanitario, 2000) 47 percent believe that the government should spend more on health care and 90 percent disagree on cost-containment in health care.
Therefore, it seems that the public backs public investment in health rather than a reduction in health care expenditure. Simultaneously, 67 percent agree in that people should be able to supplement the NHS care by purchasing PHI. As Figure 1 exhibits, an increasing share of the Spanish population perceives that the NHS worked well but needs substantial remaking. However, those who think that that the NHS needs to be redefined as well as those thinking that the NHS already works well tend to decline or remain stable over time. Therefore, some significant share of the population might react to the lack of the government adjustment of the health system to their expectations by purchasing insurance plans (25 percent in 2003).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The Spanish Insurance Law defines PHI -so called 'Seguro de Asistencia Sanitaria' -as an insurance that "provides to the insured with the medical, hospital and surgery care, with own staff of doctors whereby the insurer takes care of its own enrolees in exchange of a premium". Unlike in other EU countries, insurance policies are mainly individually (rather than corporately) purchased and, typically, benefits are received in kind rather than reimbursed to the patient. Normally, to control ex-ante moral hazard after purchasing PHI there is at least a 6-month period by which no claims can be satisfied with the exception of urgent care. 
The data
We use data from the Catalan Health Survey (CHS, 1994) . This is a crosssectional health survey of 15,000 individuals living in Catalonia and was collected during the autumn 1993. This survey -usually undertaken every five years -is a representative survey of the eight Catalan health regions. Besides standard detailed social and demographic information, it provides information on health service utilization and on attitudes towards the NHS. Although the data is not the latest survey, the most recent data on 2002, does not contain income information which makes it less suitable for our purposes.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
We include variables reflecting individual's income, age, gender and education as based on previous literature we know they have a significant impact on the decision to purchase PHI and may do also on the propensity to support the NHS support.
As displayed in Note that the way the question is formulated answering that the NHS needs to be 'changed completely' reflects a general political negative attitude towards the NHS and its role in society, and thus we believe that CHS successfully measures 'lack of support for the NHS'. Table 2 provides evidence of the interactions between support for the NHS and purchase of PHI. Looking at the object of our interest, we find that of those that buy PHI, almost nine percent has a negative attitude towards the NHS and thinks that the NHS needs to be completely changed. And, of those that think that the NHS should be completely changed, almost 29 percent buy PHI.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
As Table 2 shows, PHI subscription and lack of NHS support are more likely for those more affluent and married. Gender and health seem not to place any effect while education is higher for those that purchase PHI and support less the NHS.
The Econometric specification
The empirical work developed here is based on the assumption that individuals decide to purchase PHI 7 maximizing their expected utility and that this decision is contingent on their income; the PHI premium; and on other observable individual characteristics given a certain public health care quality. As discussed in Browning and Meghir (1991) and as applied by others in other contexts (see Mellor 1997 and French et al. 2004 , for instance), this interpretation of the PHI demand a conditional structural demand model simplifies the empirical analysis enormously.
We take thus this approach and assume that both PHI purchase decision and propensity to support the NHS are conditional on a set public health care quality.
Even though the decision of purchasing PHI and supporting or not the NHS are very likely to be simultaneous processes, we argue here that attitudes towards the NHS may be state dependent. In this sense, partially opting out (buying PHI) might reinforce previously held attitudes against or in favour of the NHS.
In this paper, we interpret that PHI purchase might influence individuals attitude towards the NHS. Thus, we specify the following equation for the decision of buying PHI as:
where I i * is a latent variable representing the individual's propensity to buy PHI, Z i is a vector of observable individual characteristics and μ i the idiosyncratic error term.
Since * I is not directly observable, we define a dichotomous decision variable I which takes value 1 when we observe PHI purchase and 0 otherwise so that I=1.
Thus, assuming a normal distribution with 0 mean and variance 1 for the random error μ i , this model can be estimated using a probit model:
where Z i is as above and Ф is the standard normal cumulative distribution.
On the other hand, we assume that the individual's latent propensity to have a negative attitude towards the NHS depends on observable and unobservable characteristics and also on the fact of having locked in a PHI contract already. Thus, the latent attitude towards the NHS, A i * , can be modelled as: ,
The propensity to have a negative attitude towards the NHS is unobserved but we assume that the individual has a negative attitude towards the NHS and answers that he/she would reform the NHS completely. By defining A i as an indicator variable that takes value 1 when the individual answers he/she would reform completely the NHS and 0 otherwise, we get the following expression:
Again, the probability that the individual has a negative attitude towards the NHS can be modelled as a probit model:
where again Ф is the normal cumulative distribution function; A i is an indicator variable for the individual's attitude towards the NHS; and ε i is a random variable normally distributed with mean zero and unit variance.
Note that the coefficient δ in equation (5) Our approach is to present a set of solutions where we address the different problems faced:
We first approach is to assume that the error terms of both PHI purchase and attitude formation are uncorrelated so that we can treat PHI as exogenous (column 1 of Table 2 ). Using these coefficients, we used a simple two step procedure suggested by Wooldridge (2002) and an estimate of ρ, the covariance between the error terms:
where β and α are the parameters associated with the reduced forms of equations 2 and 5, respectively; X and Z are the exogeneous regressors; and Φ the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function.
Note that with the bivariate probit approach we can only estimate a reduced form so that we do not obtain an estimate of δ but we can test the sign of correlation between the error terms in equation 2 and 5.
-Given that there might admittedly be some reverse causation, we control for the existence of such effects by means of a recursive bivariate probit model. This model follows the lines of Madala recursive systems number 5 (Fabbri et al, 2004 ) and allows us to undertake an additional robustness check of the influence of PHI on individuals attitudes towards the NHS.
Finally, we use an instrumental variable method for binary dependent variables.
This involves the estimation of equation 5 as a two-stage probit model using instrumental variables to correct for the endogeneity of I i . The two-stage probit model is estimated using the routine "ivprob" of the Stata software. This routine was programmed by Joseph Harkness which implements the Amemiya Generalized Least Squares (AGLS) estimators for probit and tobit with an endogenous regressor as described in Newey (1987) . The endogenous regressors are treated as linear functions of the instruments and the other exogenous variables.
Given that some argue that the effect of PHI might be not be on lack of support but on eroding previous support to the system, we run an ordered probit model assuming exogeneity of the PHI parameters after checking that and extract the marginal effects. Table 2 provides the results of different models: Column or panel 1 reports the results of the simple probit model of the variable "lack of support" for the NHS. The second panel reports the results of the bivariate probit model that does correct for the potential endogeneity of the variable lack of support for the NHS. The third panel reports the results of the recursive bivariate probit model that does correct for the potential endogeneity of the variable lack of support for the NHS and the potential reverse causality. Column four reports the IV probit model for lack of support that does correct for the endogeneity of the variable lack of support for the NHS but not for the fact that PHI is binary -this is included just for comparative reasons as the variable PHI does not appear to be exogenous in the test performed. Table 3 provides the marginal effects of the independent variables for models in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, i.e., assuming both endogeneity or exogeneity of PHI.
Results
Below we discuss our results analyzing the effect that each of the variables included has on the probability of lacking support for the NHS:
-Lack of support and PHI: In order to provide a robust response to the question posed by the paper, we first examine the effect of PHI on lack of NHS support in Table 3 . First of all, we find that holding PHI unambiguously increases the probability of lack of support towards the NHS regardless of the specification examined. Table 4 we find that assuming exogeneity does not change significantly the marginal effect of PHI on this propensity.
-The effect of other health and socio-demographic variables:
-Education and "lack of support for the NHS": Having lower education than a College degree influences negatively the likelihood of reporting "lack of support for the NHS" (see Table 3 ). In other words, higher levels of education -which is a well-accepted indicator of higher income levels -make it less likely to have a negative perception of the NHS. Age exhibits a non-linear effect so that years of life make it more likely to be critical of the NHS. Consistently, health status goes the opposite way. Males are less likely to reveal being supportive of the NHS when the confounding effect of the unobservables is corrected.
-The role of income and PHI:
Income is among the variables that determine the decision to purchase PHI. Note that the effect of the logarithm of income on the decision of buying PHI is very strong at about 0.7 for both the two biprobit models (columns 2 and 3 in Table 2 ). This suggests that PHI is a normal good and is consistent with some previous studies (Costa-Font and Garcia, 2003) . The interpretation of this result is that an income expansion leads to an expansion of the market for supplementary health care in Spain. The dummy variable "no income reported" often associated to high income levels 8 is very significant and about 0.11-0.14 for both biprobits.
-The role of income and Lack of Support for the NHS:
With respect to the effect of income on the lack of support for the NHS, we see that it is negative but insignificant when we do not correct for the potential endogeneity of PHI but becomes significant and still negative when we do (third specification).
PHI premium and PHI:
As expected, the effect of the logarithm of the insurance premium is always negative and about -1.3. Moreover, the implied price elasticity of PHI demand evaluated at the mean premium are about -0.3, indicating that potential subscribers are sensitive to potential changes in insurance premium, and in particular, that a subsidisation of the insurance premium would yield an expansion of the market for supplementary PHI in Spain.
-Goodness of fit measures: Note that the likelihood ratio specification tests reported at the bottom of all models are satisfactory. The significance of the Rho-error term of the correlation estimate at the bottom of column 3 indicates that there exists correlation between the error terms of equations 2 and 5.
Finally, in Table 5 we provide the results of an ordered probit model as well as the marginal effects of the different levels of attitude towards the NHS. Interestingly, age still displays a non-linear effect but income is significant: those relatively more affluent, those with PHI and with worse health status are more likely to exhibit lack of support for the NHS. The three columns on the right hand side of the table confirm these effects: income and PHI especially affect negatively the probability of believing the NHS does not need big changes, but positively the likelihood of considering that the NHS needs significant or extensive changes.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Conclusion
This paper provides an examination of the relationship between individual propensity to (not to) support the NHS and the expansion of the market for supplementary PHI in the context of Spain. After confirming that PHI is a luxury good, we find individuals buying PHI exhibit a lesser support for the NHS. This is a robust result that under different specifications corresponding to different assumption on the simultaneous nature of the association between PHI uptake and attitudes towards the NHS.
We have dealt with the contemporaneous association between the support for the NHS and decision of buying PHI. To control for the existence of potential endogeneity problems when estimating PHI purchase and propensity to have a negative attitude towards the NHS, we choose to estimate both processes as a twostage probit model as well as a bivariate probit model. Our results suggest that PHI makes reporting "lack of support for the NHS" more likely. In the same direction, the positive sign o the error term correlation between these two decision variables when estimated using a bivariate probit model corroborates this implication. We find that the demand for PHI affects negatively the propensity to show support towards the NHS, even when we control for social-demographic factors, income and premium paid. Interestingly, ordered probit models suggest that this effect remains when several attitudes are examined at the same time. The rough data already suggests that big changes needed at the NHS halves when individuals have PHI. Empirical specifications that attempt to control for some for of reverse causality suggest a milder though still significant effect. This suggests that even when a revolt of the rich
is not expectable at current levels, it might well be that if private health care reached a certain level this could be a plausible reaction.
The results obtained provide some empirical support to the interpretation of "purchasing PHI" as an expression of at least "partial or ideological" "opting-out" the NHS provision. These results also provide some diffuse support to the hypothesis of the 'revolt of the rich' in the sense that we show that education has a positive effect on the likelihood of showing "lack of support for the NHS" and education is typically associated with higher levels of wealth. Along the same line, we find that, when estimating the decision to buy PHI without accounting for the fact that "lack of support for the NHS" is potentially endogeneous, income seems to be picking up part of the effect of "lack of support for the NHS" on the decision to buy PHI. This mildly corroborates the association of "lack of support for the NHS" and higher levels of income.
From this, it is not far fetched to conclude that some of the effect of income, age and health on the decision of buying PHI reported in previous literature ( CostaFont and Garcia, 2003) may have been picking up the effect of the omitted variable "lack of support for the NHS". The fact that the reduced form reflected by the biprobit model which corrects for the unobserved heterogeneity influencing both PHI and "lack of support for the NHS", does produce similar coefficients than the simple probits of PHI and NHS only reinforces this belief.
Given that individuals are usually assumed to support increases in NHS spending if their willingness to pay for expanded/better coverage exceeds the tax costs that they would face (Brook, Preston and Hall, 1998) , household income is likely to determine the ability to pay for PHI as well as the preferences for certain sources of public spending, i.e. influencing both PHI purchase and "lack of support for the NHS". But, interestingly in this paper, we show that even when controlling for income, household characteristics, and premium paid, a "negative attitude towards the NHS" still influences very strongly the likelihood of purchasing PHI and takes away some of the effect of the other socio-demographic variables.
One policy related interpretation of our findings is that increases in the size of the market for supplementary health insurance might have effects that are not obvious. Since that those that opt-out completely or partially are usually unsatisfied with the NHS, and wealthier individuals have low incentives to support costly NHS reforms, a potential long run effect might be shrinking the size of the welfare state in those areas where the NHS competes with the private sector It is worth mentioning some caveats as well. Mainly, that we have used data from a specific region-state of Spain to test the above hypothesis. Thus, our database is representative of Catalonia rather than Spain as a whole, and Catalonia has the particular characteristic of having a long tradition of private health care. Our database is from 1994 and does not contain data for other years. Therefore, we cannot control for dynamic effects whereas one might argue that there is some 'habit formation' in the decision to purchase PHI and also some persistence of a negative attitude towards the NHS. Furthermore, we concentrate in individual rather than corporate finance PHI given that the market share of the latter was negligible in 1994. Also, although the implication of this is uncertain, there is some indication that those purchasing PHI keep using the public system (Vera-Hernández, 1999; and López et al 2000) . Finally, our results indicate some evidence of the contemporaneous effects of support for the NHS and PHI; whilst one might well argue that there is some delay in individuals' partial opting out decision. However, data availability does not allow us to examine these effects as far as no panel data evidence is available. 
